The Narrative Structure of Global Weakening
CommentsNEW
HAVEN – Recent indications of a weakening global economy have led many
people to wonder how pervasive poor economic performance will be in the
coming years. Are we facing a long global slump, or possibly even a
depression?
CommentsA
fundamental problem in forecasting nowadays is that the ultimate causes
of the slowdown are really psychological and sociological, and relate
to fluctuating confidence and changing “animal spirits,” about which
George Akerlof and I have written.
We argue that such shifts reflect changing stories, epidemics of new
narratives, and associated views of the world, which are difficult to
quantify.
CommentsIn
fact, most professional economists do not seem overly glum about the
global economy’s prospects. For example, on September 6, the OECD issued
an interim assessment
on the near-term global outlook, written by Pier Carlo Padoan, that
blandly reports “significant risks” on the horizon – the language of
uncertainty itself.
CommentsThe
problem is that the statistical models that comprise economists’
toolkit are best applied in normal times, so economists naturally like
to describe the situation as normal. If the current slowdown is typical
of other slowdowns in recent decades, then we can predict the same kind
of recovery.
CommentsFor example, in a paper
presented last spring at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC,
James Stock of Harvard University and Mark Watson of Princeton
University unveiled a new “dynamic factor model,” estimated using data
from 1959 to 2011. Having thus excluded the Great Depression, they
claimed that the recent slowdown in the United States is basically no
different from other recent slowdowns, except larger.
CommentsTheir
model reduces the sources of all recessions to just six shocks – “oil,
monetary policy, productivity, uncertainty, liquidity/financial risk,
and fiscal policy” – and explains most of the post-2007 downturn in
terms of just two of these factors: “uncertainty” and
“liquidity/financial risk.” But, even if we accept that conclusion, we
are left to wonder what caused large shocks to “uncertainty” and to
“liquidity/financial risk” in recent years, and how reliably such shocks
can be predicted.
CommentsWhen
one considers the evidence about external economic shocks over the past
year or two, what emerges are stories whose precise significance is
unknowable. We only know that most of us have heard them many times.
CommentsForemost
among those stories is the European financial crisis, which is talked
about everywhere around the globe. The OECD’s interim assessment called
it “the most important risk for the global economy.” That may seem
unlikely: Why should the European crisis be so important elsewhere?
CommentsPart
of the reason, of course, is the rise of global trade and financial
markets. But connections between countries do not occur solely through
the direct impact of market prices. Interacting public psychology is
likely to play a role as well.
CommentsThis
brings us to the importance of stories – and very far from the kind of
statistical analysis exemplified by Stock and Watson. Psychologists have
stressed that there is a narrative basis to human thinking: people
remember – and are motivated by – stories, particularly human-interest
stories about real people. Popular stories tend to take on moral
dimensions, leading people to imagine that bad outcomes reflect some
kind of loss of moral resolve
.
CommentsThe
European crisis began with a Greek meltdown story, and it appears that
the entire global economy is threatened by events in a country of only
11 million people. But the economic importance of stories bears no close
relation to their monetary value (which can be measured only after the
fact, if at all). It depends, instead, on their story value.
CommentsThe
Greek crisis story began in 2008 with reports of widespread protests
and strikes when the government proposed raising the retirement age to
address a pension funding shortfall. Reports began to appear in global
news media portraying an excessive sense of entitlement, with Greeks
taking to the streets in protest, even though the increase was modest
(for example, women with children or in hazardous jobs would be able to
retire with full benefits at just 55, up from 50).
CommentsThat
story might have invited some gossip outside of Greece, but it gained
little purchase on international attention until the end of 2009, when
the market for Greek debt started to become increasingly unsettled, with
rising interest rates causing further problems for the government. This
augmented news reports about Greek profligacy, and thus closed a
negative feedback loop by attracting intensifying public interest, which
eventually fueled crises in other European countries. Like a YouTube
video, the Greek story went viral.
CommentsOne
might object that most people outside of Europe surely were not
following the European crisis closely, and the least informed have not
even heard of it. But opinion leaders, and friends and relatives of the
least informed in each country, were following it, and their influence
can create an atmosphere that makes everyone less willing to spend.
CommentsThe
Greek story seems connected in many people’s minds with the stories of
the real-estate and stock-market bubbles that preceded the current
crisis in 2007. These asset bubbles were inflated by lax lending
standards and an excessive willingness to borrow, which seemed similar
to the Greek government’s willingness to take on debt to pay lavish
pensions. Thus, people saw the Greek crisis not just as a metaphor, but
also as a morality tale. The natural consequence was to support
government austerity programs, which can only make the situation worse.
CommentsThe
European story is with us now, all over the world, so vivid that, even
if the euro crisis appears to be resolved satisfactorily, it will not be
forgotten until some new story diverts public attention. Then as now,
we will not be able to understand the world economic outlook fully
without considering the story on people’s minds.
Now here is the neat part. He says that mathematical models only apply in "normal times"! What a lot of crap! There are no "normal" times. The economy is either expanding or contracting. See "The Great Recession Conspiracy" for an explanation in simple terms. "Normal Times" are that mythical time in macroeconomic theory when the economy is neither expanding or contracting. That only happens in the lalala land of economists!! Fools, even well meaning ones, are destroying our economy!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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