From the beginning, this rant has tried to make the point that the United States of America is becoming a more and more sharply divided country, and that is a very, very serious problem. When this is called to the attention of Republicans, the response is always that you are trying to screw the rich people and they are the ones who create jobs. Both of those points are demonstrably FALSE, but that fact never seems too occur to them. Now, serious research evidence is beginning to appear to document these facts. Here is today's New York Times review of the first book to support the contention of this rant. When I have time to read the book, I will add my two cents.
Why Some Countries Go Bust
By ADAM DAVIDSON
By his own admission, Daron Acemoglu is a slightly pudgy and fairly
nerdy guy with an unpronounceable last name. But when I mentioned that I
was interviewing him to two econ buffs, they each gasped and said, “I
love Daron Acemoglu,” as if I were talking about Keith Richards. The
Turkish M.I.T. professor — who, right now, is about as hot as economists
get — acquired his renown for serious advances in answering the single
most important question in his profession, the same one that compelled
Adam Smith to write “The Wealth of Nations”: why are some countries rich
while others are poor?
Over the centuries, proposed answers have varied greatly. Smith declared
that the difference between wealth and poverty resulted from the
relative freedom of the markets; Thomas Malthus said poverty comes from
overpopulation; and John Maynard Keynes claimed it was a byproduct of a
lack of technocrats. (Of course, everyone knows that politicians love
listening to wonky bureaucrats!) Jeffrey Sachs, one of the world’s most
famous economists, asserts that poor soil, lack of navigable rivers and
tropical diseases are, in part, to blame. Others point to culture,
geography, climate, colonization and military might. The list goes on.
But through a series of legendary — and somewhat controversial —
academic papers published over the past decade, Acemoglu has
persuasively challenged many of the previous theories. (If poverty were
primarily the result of geography, say, or an unfortunate history, how
can we account for the successes of Botswana, Costa Rica or Thailand?)
Now, in their new book, “Why Nations Fail,”
Acemoglu and his collaborator, James Robinson, argue that the wealth of
a country is most closely correlated with the degree to which the
average person shares in the overall growth of its economy. It’s an idea
that was first raised by Smith but was then largely ignored for
centuries as economics became focused on theoretical models of ideal
economies rather than the not-at-all-ideal problems of real nations.
Consider Acemoglu’s idea from the perspective of a poor farmer. In parts
of modern sub-Saharan Africa, as was true in medieval Europe or the
antebellum South, the people who work the fields lack any incentive to
improve their yield because any surplus is taken by the wealthy elite.
This mind-set changes only when farmers are given strong property rights
and discover that they can profit from extra production. In 1978, China
began allowing farmers to benefit from any surplus they produced. The
decision, most economists agree, helped spark the country’s astounding
growth.
According to Acemoglu’s thesis, when a nation’s institutions prevent the
poor from profiting from their work, no amount of disease eradication,
good economic advice or foreign aid seems to help. I observed this
firsthand when I visited a group of Haitian mango farmers a few years
ago. Each farmer had no more than one or two mango trees, even though
their land lay along a river that could irrigate their fields and
support hundreds of trees. So why didn’t they install irrigation pipes?
Were they ignorant, indifferent? In fact, they were quite savvy and
lived in a region teeming with well-intended foreign-aid programs. But
these farmers also knew that nobody in their village had clear title to
the land they farmed. If they suddenly grew a few hundred mango trees,
it was likely that a well-connected member of the elite would show up
and claim their land and its spoils. What was the point?
I encountered another side of Acemoglu’s thesis during what must have
been one of history’s great natural economic experiments: post-Saddam
Hussein Baghdad. On April 9, 2003, the day the city was captured, one of
the world’s most tightly controlled economies suddenly became a
free-for-all. Amid the chaos, many former state functionaries turned
into entrepreneurs. Nearly every engineer from the ministry of housing,
it seemed, had opened his own construction company. Satellite TVs, once
illegal to all but a very small elite, were sold on every major street.
Under Hussein, only one company (widely rumored to be monitored by the
intelligence service) offered Internet access, and it was incredibly bad
and expensive. After it was gone, there were so many new Internet
companies that I had far more access options then than I do today in
Brooklyn.
Yet the American authorities, who had not planned for this budding free
market, all but destroyed it when they gave the bulk of new contracts to
large companies outside the country. Often, these outsiders
subcontracted to Iraqi firms with close ties to the state’s new
political establishment. By the anniversary of the United States
invasion, it was clear that economic success would again come from
connections and corruption rather than talent and hard work. Today,
Transparency International ranks Iraq as one of the most corrupt nations
on earth. An Iraqi friend once told me that he had hoped we would teach
the Iraqis how to be Americans. Instead, the Americans learned how to
be Iraqi.
Acemoglu, Robinson and their collaborators did not come up with the idea
that incentives matter, of course, nor the notion that politics play a
role in economic development. Their great contribution has been a series
of clever historical studies that persuasively argue that the cheesiest
of slogans is actually correct: the true value of a nation is its
people. If national institutions give even their poorest and least
educated citizens some shot at improving their own lives — through
property rights, a reliable judicial system or access to markets — those
citizens will do what it takes to make themselves and their country
richer. This suggests, among other things, that instead of supporting
one-off programs promoting health or agricultural productivity, the
international community should focus its aid efforts on deep political
and economic change.
Perhaps just as interesting, “Why Nations Fail” also shows the effects
of different economic and political systems over the centuries. The
sections on ancient Rome and medieval Venice are particularly
compelling, because they show how fairly open and prosperous societies
can revert to closed and impoverished autocracies. It’s hard to read
these sections without thinking about the present-day United States,
where economic inequality has grown substantially over the past few
decades. Is the 1 percent emerging as a wealth-stripping,
poverty-inducing elite?
Well, maybe. Acemoglu and Robinson’s frequent collaborator Simon
Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund,
told me that financial firms have so thoroughly co-opted the political
process that the American economy has become fundamentally unsound.
“It’s bad and getting worse,” he told me. Barring some major shift in
our political system, he suggested, the United States could be on its
way to serious economic failure.
Charles Calomiris, an economist at Columbia University, is less worried.
But it’s not because he thinks that banks haven’t co-opted our
political system. “We’ve never had a good banking system,” he says.
“What’s amazing about America is that we’ve been the most successful
economy in the world while being crippled by political constraints on
the quality of our banking system.” This has been going on since the
1700s, Calomiris says, and he doesn’t see any reason for the United
States’ economy to stop growing anytime soon.
Acemoglu and Robinson are on the pessimistic side of optimism about the
United States’ chances of a resurgence. Congress, they told me, is too
heavily influenced by the wealthy, and the advent of super PACs has only
given elites more power. Yet Acemoglu surprised me when he said he was
encouraged by the rise of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street. While
neither has an especially coherent or subtle economic agenda, both show
that, however frustrated they might be, large numbers of Americans still
believe they can influence the political process to improve their
fortunes. Since the future of American economic health lies in its
people, Acemoglu explained, as long as Americans believe they can
influence the process, they will.
But, he quickly pointed out, what if Americans find their protests have
no impact? What if the United States becomes a truly extractive nation,
with violent repression of protest or — in some ways, worse — the
grudging acquiescence of the beaten-down masses? While many Americans
are frustrated by the divisive, often angry public debates over our
economic future, we may only be in real trouble at the very moment that
they shut up.
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